ADOLPH M. KOVEN
304 Greenwich Street
San Francisco, California 94133
Telephone: (415) 392-6548

5

RECEIVED RECEIVED TOWNS COMM

In the Matter of

ASSOCIATION FOR LOS ANGELES DEPUTY SHERIFFS,

Charging Party,

and

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,

Respondent,

concerning

Charge of unfair employee relations practice.

HEARING OFFICER

REPORT

UFC 14.2

16 17

18 19

20

21

22

23

25

26

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

The instant proceedings were initiated with the filing of certain "charges" before the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission in which the LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, hereinafter referred to as the "Department," is accused of unfair employee relations practices in its refusal to deal directly with the designated representative of the ASSOCIATION FOR LOS ANGELES DEPUTY SHERIFFS, hereinafter referred to as "ALADS." In due time the undersigned was appointed Hearing Officer and notice thereof was served upon the parties. The report which follows is prepared for submission to the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission.

27 28 29

30

31

THE HEARING

A hearing before the undersigned was held in Los Angeles, California on April 4, 1972. Throughout the course of the proceedings both parties were permitted full opportunity to present

ADOLPH M. KOVEN
LAW SORPORATION
'ENTHOUSE-JULIUS' CASTLE
384 SREEHWICH STREET
EXERGON 3-6548

evidence in support of their respective contentions. The testimony of all witnesses was taken under oath. Thereafter a verbatim transcript of the proceedings was prepared. Both parties filed post-hearing briefs.

APPEARANCES

The charging party, ALADS, was represented at the hearing by JAMES R. TWEEDY of Tweedy, Pinhey and Howard, Attorneys at Law. The appearance on behalf of the Department was made by LARRY A. CURTIS, Deputy County Counsel of the Office of the County Counsel, John D. Maharg.

RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEE RELATIONS ORDINANCE

Section 2 Statement of Policy

The Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles declare that it is the public policy of the County and the purpose of this ordinance to promote the improvement of personnel ... relations between the County of Los Angeles and its employees.... This policy is supplemented by provisions (a) recognizing and defining the rights of employees to join organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on matters affecting employee relations.... (c) creating an independent Employee Relations Commission to ensure that all County employees and their representatives are fairly treated, that their rights are maintained and that their requests are fairly heard, considered and resolved.

Section 4

Employees of the County shall have the right to form, join and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on all matters of employee relations... No employee shall be interfered with, intimidated, restrained, coerced or discriminated against because of his exercise of these rights.

Section 6(a)

All matters affecting employee relations, including those that are not subject to negotiations, are subject to consultation between management representatives and the duly authorized representatives of affected employee organizations.

Section 12(a)

It shall be an unfair employee relations practice for the County

ADDLPH M. KOVEN
LAW GORPORATION
SENTHOUSE-JULIUS GASTLE
304 SREEKWICH STREET
EXDRODK 3-6548

(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights recognized or granted in this Ordinance

(2) To ... interfere with the formation of any employee organization.

Section 8(a)

All matters affecting employee relations ... are subject to consultation between management representatives and the duly authorized representatives of affected employee organizations.

Section 3(d)

"Consult" or "confer" means to communicate verbally or in writing for the purpose of presenting and obtaining views or advising on intended actions.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (hereinafter called ALADS) is a duly qualified but non-certified
organization representing 1,000 deputy sheriffs. Majority
representation for the deputy sheriffs is held by another
organization, which has been certified and has the power to
negotiate on behalf of deputy sheriffs employed by the Sheriff's
Department.

On February 1, 1972, Claud T. Smith, a retired Division Chief of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, was employed as Administrator for ALADS, and on February 3, he registered with the County's Employee Relations Branch as an authorized representative of that organization. His duties as ALADS Administrator required that he discuss grievances and complaints of the members of ALADS with the Department, mediate between ALADS members and the Department, and independently investigate any charges against ALADS members brought by the Department.

On February 7, 1972, members of the Board of Directors of ALADS were called to the Undersheriff's office and advised

ADOLPH M. KOVEN
LAW GORPORATION
'ENTHOUSE-JULIUS' CASTLE
284 SREEHWICH STREET
EXBROOK 2-6548

that the Sheriff had instructed him to notify them that Smith would not be welcome at any Department facilities; that Department Management had been advised not to have any dealings with Smith, but that other representatives of ALADS as well as individual members were welcome to contact Management regarding any problems which might arise. Furthermore, stated the Undersheriff, if ALADS "took care of the problem properly" it would open more doors for the organization. The Sheriff ordered supervisory personnel not to communicate with Smith in any way, and ordered that Smith was not to be welcomed at any Sheriff's facility.

Inspector Pipkin or the Department's Personnel Bureau is the Department's representative in dealings with both certified and non-certified employee groups. Prior to Smith's employment, Pipkin had dealings with officials of ALADS including its Administrator. In fact, it was understood that the ALADS Administrator prior to February 1972 was to contact either Pipkin or another Management employee within the Department in the event a problem regarding a member of ALADS arose. Even after February 1972, Pipkin was willing to deal with representatives of ALADS other than Smith or with ALADS members personally. Only Smith could have no dealings with the Management of the Sheriff's Department.

No evidence was produced as to the reason Smith was barred from contact with the Management of the Department. After the order of the Sheriff, on numerous occasions Smith attempted to contact Pipkin as well as other members of Management. Pipkin would not return his calls or meet with him, and the other members of the Department made it clear that they were not to have any contact with Smith. However, Smith did have access to Nevins, Personnel Relations Administrator for the County Department of Personnel. Nevins had been designated by the Sheriff's

ADDLPH M. KOVEN
LAW GORFGRATION
PENTHOUSE-JULIUS' CASTLE
384 SREENWICH STREET
EXCHANGES -4-5-4-8

Department to be available to Smith for consultation and to provide Smith with information. Smith was given complete access to Nevins.

During the month between the time that Smith was registered as the authorized representative of ALADS and the filing of charges against the Department and its members, Smith attempted to resolve several problems involving personnel problems of ALADS members relating to a detention facility at which they were employed. Smith sent a registered letter to Pipkin regarding the matter. Pipkin did not reply, but instead Nevins replied. The Department contends that other employee organizations already had brought the problems at the detention facility to the Department's attention; that corrective action was under way by the time Smith's letter to Pipkin was sent; and that the matters complained of in Smith's letter were already moot. In addition, Smith attempted to obtain blank grievance forms for ALADS. Nevins suggested that such forms be obtained from Pipkin but when Smith attempted to do so he was unable to see Pipkin and other Department members would not supply the forms. Evidence was introduced that it was the Department policy not to supply such forms to any employee organizations so that the formal filing of grievances would be discouraged.

On March 3, 1972 ALADS filed a charge against the Department, the Sheriff, the Undersheriff, Pipkin, and three other officers, in essence alleging that they had committed unfair labor practices in the following respects:

- The Sheriff ordered all supervisory personnel to refrain from communicating with Smith or to permit him to visit Sheriff's facilities.
- Pipkin, the designated liaison officer between
 ALADS and the Department refused to communicate with Smith.
 - 3. The Commander of the West Hollywood Sheriff's Station

ADDLPH M. KOVEN
LAW GORPORATION
PENTHOUSE-JULIUS' CASTLE
384 GREENWICH STREET
EXERDOR 2-6548

1

2

3

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

16

17

18

19

20

21 22

23

24

25

26 27

28 29

30

31

directed staff personnel that Smith was not to be permitted to attend station briefings or to discuss policies and procedures with Deputies.

- Pipkin failed to answer the letter addressed to him regarding problems at the detention facility.
- 5. The failure of Pipkin to see Smith when Smith attempted to procure the grievance forms, and the failure of other Department officers to supply Smith with the forms. POSITION OF ALADS

The specific purpose of Section 2 of the Employee Relations Ordinance is to promote and improve personnel relations between the County and its employees, and to ensure that all County employees and their representatives are fairly treated and their requests fairly heard and resolved. It also recognizes the rights of employees to join organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on matters affecting employee relations. The purpose of these provisions as well as those quoted above is to protect all employee organizations and to encourage communication between Management representatives and authorized representatives of employee organizations.

The Department had virtually cut off all effective means of communication between the ALADS' authorized representative and Management representatives who are members of the Department, thereby interfering with ALADS' function in its role as the representative of its members. The Department took this action even though no evidence was produced that Smith is not a fit or qualified person to act as a representative of ALADS. Thus, an unfair labor relations practice was committed as defined in Section 12(a)(1) of the Ordinance.

The Department's argument that Nevins, an Employee Relations Administrator with the Department of Personnel, is qualified to act as the sole representative to deal with ALADS

is not supported by the evidence since his job description does not include meeting and conferring with minority employee organizations.

It is also clear that the Department has committed an unfair labor practice in that it has violated Section 12(a)(2), which prohibits the Department from interfering in the formation of any employee organization. Even though ALADS is a duly constituted and qualified minority employee organization, nevertheless, the various employee organizations are constantly competing with one another for new members, and their formation is thus a continual process. The Department is attempting to emasculate the effectiveness of ALADS. If the Department is permitted to take these actions, ALADS will find itself unable to compete with other employee organizations, thus resulting in a diminution of its membership.

POSITION OF DEPARTMENT:

The Department has not been guilty of any unfair labor practices as defined in the Employee Relations Ordinance. Section 12(a)(1) provides that it is an unfair labor practice to interfere with employees in the exercise of their rights, and these rights under Section 4 include the rights to form, join and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing. No showing was made that any employee was interfered with or that any employee was adversely affected because of the Department's refusal to deal with Smith.

Nor has interference with the rights specified by Section 12(a)(2) been shown. ALADS is a functioning employee organization, and therefore, in no way can the Department be said to have interfered in its formation.

The only rights which a non-certified employee organization such as ALADS enjoys is to represent its members regarding grievances and to consult with "management representatives" on

ADDLPH M. KOVEN LAW GORPORATION PENTHOUSE-JULIUS' GASTLE 284 SREEHWIGH STREET matters of concern. No evidence was produced that ALADS attempted to represent its members on a specific grievance. It is true that Smith attempted to obtain grievance forms from the Department and was unsuccessful in doing so, but the evidence also shows that although such forms were readily available to individual employees they were not available to any employee organization.

As to ALADS' right as such to consult with Management, the evidence shows that this right was not unduly impaired. Management has the right to designate certain representatives to consult with employee organizations and the Sheriff designated Nevins, an Employee Relations Administrator to deal with Smith. The Employee Relations Ordinance permits the Sheriff to designate any duly authorized representatives of the Department to consult with employee organizations, and the Sheriff appointed Nevins in such capacity. Furthermore, Management within the Sheriff's Department was willing to deal with any representative of ALADS other than Smith or any member of that organization. Thus, no violation occurred by the Department of the Ordinance in designating Nevins rather than Management within the Department to deal with Smith.

Another complaint of ALADS is that Smith was barred from station briefings, but the evidence shows that no representatives of an employee organization were permitted to attend station briefings in respect to the conduct of Union business.

ALADS was accorded the same treatment as other employee organizations, particularly those organizations who hold a minority status.

Cases concerning unfair labor practices in the private sector are generally not helpful because they usually concern a situation in which a Union is the exclusive representative of all employees, as opposed to majority recognition with concurrent existence of minority unions such as is in the instant case.

ADDLPH M. KOVEN
LAW GORPORATION
PENTHOUSE-JULIUS* CASTLE
384 SREEHWIGH STREET
EXERDOX 3-6548

CONCLUSION:

1

3

5

6 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14 15

16 17

18 19

20

21

22

23

25

26 27

28

29

20

31

32

The determinative issue in this dispute is not whether the Department was entitled under the Employee Relations Ordinance to refuse to deal directly with a non-certified employee organization such as ALADS but, rather, whether the Department was within its rights in refusing to deal with the specific representative of ALADS who was designated by that organization to deal with the Department. It is clear from the evidence, and not denied by the Department, that it was only Smith who was forbidden to deal directly with Department Management personnel and that any other representative of ALADS as well as any individual member of ALADS could continue to deal directly with Pipkin, the liaison officer designated by the Department to deal with both certified and non-certified employee organizations. The essential issue, therefore, is whether the Department was privileged under the Ordinance to preclude not ALADS but whether it could preclude the duly designated representative of ALADS from direct contact with the Department.

The Ordinance provides that employees of the Department have the right to participate in organizations for the purpose of representation on all matters of employee relations (Section 4); that all matters affecting employee relations are subject to consultation between Management representatives and the duly authorized representatives of employee organizations (Section 8(a)); and that one purpose of the Ordinance is to create an Employee Relations Commission to assure that all County employees and their representatives are fairly treated and their requests fairly heard, considered and resolved (Section 2). Consultation is defined as "to communicate verbally or in writing for the purpose of presenting and obtaining views or advising of intended actions" (Section 3(d)) and all matters of employee relations are specifically held to be the subject of consultation between

ADDLPH M. KOVEN
LAW SORPERATION
PENTHOUSE-JULIUS' CASTLE
SOA SECENWICH STREET
EXERGISE 5-4548

Management representatives and the duly authorized representative of affected employee organizations.

The Department, by ordering that Smith was to have no direct contact with Management representatives directly concerned with liaison between the Department and ALADS, has in effect banned the duly authorized representative of ALADS from any access to Department employees concerned with employee grievances. Not a scintilla of evidence was produced to justify the conclusion that Smith is incapable of representing ALADS members or that he is not fit to do so. In the absence of some evidence in this regard, the conclusion must follow that the Department's conduct represents a direct interference with the effective functioning of ALADS on behalf of its members. So long as employees are privileged to choose their own representatives to deal with the Department under Section 4 (whether or not the chosen representative is an employee or a non-employee of the Department), it would follow that the Department must deal with the chosen representative without interference or discrimination. To fail to do so clearly constitutes an interference with the exercise of the right to choose a representative granted to a member of the employee organization and thus constitutes an unfair employee relations practice under Section 12(a)(1).

The right to free access to Management by the representatives chosen by an employee organization is an important one. If the Sheriff could refuse, without justification, to deal directly with the representative chosen by ALADS members, he would be in a position, if he chose to do so, to exercise considerable powers of coercion over the organization. Thus, in the event that ALADS might select an Administrator who was unusually effective and if the Department is to prevail in this dispute, Management could simply refuse to deal directly with such Administrator. The evidence suggests something in the nature of coercion in the

ADOLPH M. KOVEN
LAW CORPORATION
PERTHOUSE-JULIUS' CASTLE
384 SREENWICH STREET
EXCHADEX 2-6548

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21 22

23

24

25

26

28

20

Smith-ALADS situation since the Undersheriff told the Board of Directors of ALADS that although the Sheriff's Department would refuse to deal directly with Smith, if ALADS took care of the problem properly, more doors would be open to the organization. Such interference in the choice of representatives falls clearly within the scope of an unfair employee relations practice as defined in Section 12(a)(1) of the Ordinance.

The fact that the Department designated Nevins, an employee of another department, to deal with Smith, does not immunize the Department from the charge of committing an unfair employee relations practice. The Department's argument that the Sheriff has the right to designate anyone he chooses to act as the Department's representative in consulting with employee organizations is unpersuasive in view of undisputed evidence that both before and after Smith's appointment, ALADS representatives were not confined to dealings with Nevins, but could also deal with Pipkin and other members of the Department. Thus, it would be more correct to say that the Sheriff designated Nevins to deal with Smith personally rather than with ALADS since it is clear that ALADS representatives other than Smith had access to both the Department directly and to Nevins. The fact that most of ALADS' dealings occurred directly with the Department prior to Smith's appointment is demonstrated by Nevins' testimony that he had had only two contacts with ALADS representatives in the ten months prior to Smith's appointment, and neither of these contacts appears clearly to have related to employee grievances.

It is not at all clear from Nevins' job description that he is permitted to participate in consultation with employee organizations. 1/ Nor was there any showing that Nevins had any

ADDLPH M. KOVEN
LAW GORPORATION
PENTHOUSE-JULIUS* CASTLE
384 SREERWICH STREET
EXERDER S-6546

2

3

4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 29

I/ An Employee Relations Administrator, such as Nevins is required to represent the Director of Personnel in "negotiations" with representatives of employee organizations. Clearly, only certified employee organizations (ALADS is not certified) are entitled to conduct negotiations on behalf of the employees they represent.

direct knowledge of the affairs of the Department to permit him to deal adequately with the question of grievances by ALADS members, and no justification was advanced for requiring Smith to approach the Department indirectly through Nevins rather than directly through Pipkin who is the officer designated by the Department to deal with employee organizations.

As to the specific charges filed by ALADS, it seems clear from what has been said above that the Department committed an unfair employee relations practice under Section 12(a)(1) of the Ordinance by prohibiting Management of the Department from dealing directly with Smith. Pipkin, the liaison officer designated by the Department, must consult with Smith and Smith must be permitted to visit Sheriff's facilities for the purpose of consulting personally with Pipkin or other Department members charged with dealing with employee organizations.

The Department made it clear that employee organizations are not supplied with grievance forms and that no representatives of employee organizations are permitted to attend station briefings. Therefore, it was not an unfair employee relations practice to fail to supply the forms to Smith or to bar him from the meeting. We need not consider the problem involving Pipkin's failure to reply to Smith's letter setting forth problems at the detention facility. Whether or not the problem was moot by the time that Smith's letter was received by Pipkin is not crucial, what is important is that in the future Pipkin or another member of the Department designated to deal with employee organizations must deal with Smith regarding problems appropriate for discussion with ALADS rather than to refer all inquiries from Smith to Nevins (as was done regarding the problem of the employees in the detention center). In short, the conclusion follows that Smith must be granted the same privileges to consult with the Department as the representatives of other employee organizations. We are not faced

1

2

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

with the problem of whether the Department may make distinctions in the prvileges accorded certified as opposed to non-certified employee organizations since the unfair practices alleged by the charges did not relate to discrimination against ALADS as a non-certified employee organization but against Smith personally.

In view of the conclusion that the Department committed an unfair employee relations practice as defined in Section 12(a)(1) of the Ordinance, it is not necessary to consider also whether the Department's conduct constituted an unfair employee relations practice as defined in Section 12(a)(2) of the Ordinance.

RECOMMENDED FINAL ORDER

It is respectfully recommended that the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission issue an Order finding the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department committed an unfair employee relations practice in forbidding Management within the Department to communicate or consult with Smith and in refusing to consult with Smith.

Dated: 6/20/12

ADOLPH M. KOVEN, Hearing Officer

31
32
ADDLPH M. KOVEN
LAW GORPORATION
PENTHOUST-JULIUS CASTLE

304 BREENWICH STREET